Abstract. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) networks are of much interest due to their capacity of providing extremely high security keys to network participants. Most QKD network studies so far focus on trusted models where all the network nodes are assumed to be perfectly secured. This restricts QKD networks to be small. In this paper, we first develop a novel model dedicated to large-scale QKD networks, some of whose nodes could be eavesdropped secretely. Then, we investigate the key transmission problem in the new model by an approach based on percolation theory and stochastic routing. Analyses show that under computable conditions large-scale QKD networks could protect secret keys with an extremely high probability. Simulations validate our results.
Introduction
The problem of transmitting a secret key from an origin to a destination over the network was considered for a long time. The current solution in most Internet applications is using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). PKI relies on plausible but unproven assumptions about the computation power of eavesdroppers and the non-existence of effective algorithms for certain mathematical hard problems. As a result, PKI cannot meet the highest security level, also called unconditional security. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology is a prominent alternative [1] . It was proven that QKD can provide unconditional security [2] [3] [4] . It is successfully implemented in realistic applications [5] [6] [7] [8] . However, QKD only supports point-to-point connections and intrinsically causes serious limits on throughput and range [5, 9] . A long-distance QKD transmission needs intermediate nodes to relay the key. In realistic scenarios, some of these nodes could be eavesdropped without the others knowing it. In consequence, the security of key will be compromised. Larger networks are more vulnerable. This paper studies a partially compromised QKD network model that allows any member pair establishing securely a common key with almost certainty. The contributions are (i) a model of partially compromised QKD networks, (ii) the use of percolation theory techniques to find where almost-certainty can be achieved, (iii) stochastic routing proposals capable of achieving a given secrecy level.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the QKD network's context and proposes a novel model of the world-wide QKD network. Section 3 presents related works. Section 4 seeks for the necessary condition to achieve a given high secrecy of key transmissions. Section 5 presents our adaptive stochastic routing algorithms and analyzes their performances. We conclude in Section 6. The proofs of the theorems are given in Appendix.
A proposal for the world-wide quantum network
Preliminary QKD networks present two types of links: classical and QKD. Classical links are easy to implement, capable of providing high-speed but lowconfidentiality communications. By contrast, QKD links aim at unconditional security. This causes undesirable limits of rate and range [5, 9] . The ultimate goal of QKD networks is unconditional security. QKD networks rather sustain QKD's restrictions to reach this goal. As such, there is no need to consider classical links in studying QKD network prototypes. In the following we will simply write links instead of QKD links.
The feasibly-implemented model of QKD networks so far is the trusted network model. Its representers are SECOQC and DARPA networks [6, [10] [11] [12] . This model assumes that all the network nodes are perfectly secured. This assumption is too strong in large-scale scenarios. Actually, eavesdroppers can ingeniously attack a proportion of nodes without leaving any trace in large-scale networks. Consequently, security may be compromised.
Restricted by a modest length of link, QKD networks don't present many choices of topology. Meshed topology would suit QKD networks [12] . Besides, distributed architecture is considered to be good. This paper follows these ideas. However we focus on the world-wide quantum network that is very different from small-scale quantum networks like DARPA and SECOQC. For simplicity, we choose the 4-connected grid topology. Nodes are represented by squares. Links have no representation because they have no effect on security analysis (see Fig. 1 ).
In QKD networks, intermediate nodes are vulnerable. Attacks are either detectable or undetectable. In principle, if an attack is detectable then we can find solutions to fix it. Undetectable attacks are very dangerous. We cannot detect them until great damage has been done. We take into account such attacks. Assume that each node sustains a probability p e being eavesdropped without knowledge of the others. For simplicity, we focus only on cases where p e is the same for all the nodes. Note that p e should be small unless eavesdropper resources are much larger than those of legitimate users.
Modeling the world-wide QKD network problem Consider a 4-connected grid lattice network (see Fig. 1 ). The network is large enough so that we can ignore its borders. Nodes are represented by squares. Each node is connected with its four neighbors. Links however are not represented since they do not affect the security analysis. In graph theory our network is described as follows. Network is the set of vertices V = Z 2 . A vertex is safe if it is not eavesdropped. Otherwise, it is called unsafe. Each vertex is eavesdropped without any trace with probability p e ∈ [0, 1]. As mentioned above, we focus only on the cases where p e is the same for all the vertices. The probability that a vertex is safe is
Alice and Bob are represented by vertices v A and v B . Alice wants to convey a secret key K to Bob. We study the secrecy probability Σ that K is not revealed to the eavesdropper Eve. If v A and v B are adjacent then K certainly is safe, i.e. Σ = 1. Otherwise, K must pass over l intermediate vertices
A path is safe if all its nodes are safe.
We define the length of path as the number of intermediate vertices. Since K is transmitted in π, we have Σ(K) = p l s . This implies that Σ is dramatically decreased with respect to (w.r.t) the length l. We focus on a simple way to improve Σ: sending a number of sub-keys K 1 , K 2 , .., K N by different paths π 1 , π 2 , .., π N . K is computed by a bitwise XOR operation over K 1 , K 2 , .., K N . As such, K is safe unless Eve intercepts all π 1 , π 2 , .., π N . If the graph presents safe paths then with a larger N , K is more likley to be safe. The following questions are basic:
1. When are all the safe vertices almost certainly connected? In other words, find the condition on p s such that ∀∆ ∈ [0, 1] :
., π N from v A to v B generated by a proposed routing algorithm. Let λ(N ) be the secrecy probability of the final key if N sub-keys are sent by
the center of a graph [13] [14] [15] . The 2-dimensional site percolation model can be roughly described as follows. Let G = (V, E) be a graph with vertices set V and edges set E. Fig. 2 roughly shows the behavior of θ w.r.t p o . The value p c , the critical probability, is the minimum
The 2-dimensional site percolation's framework is similar to our network model's one. The open probability p o and the safe probability p s play an equivalent role. If we set p s = p o and assume that v A sends to v B an infinite set of sub-keys K 1 , K 2 , .. by an infinite set of different paths π 1 , π 2 , .., then the secrecy probability Σ of the final key K is identical to the probability existing a safe path between v A and v B . However this probability is equivalent to the probability θ that almost open vertices belong to the infinite open cluster. We can apply to Σ two important properties of θ [15]:
1. θ is a non-decreasing and continuous function in the right of p c (see Fig. 2 ). 2. The number of infinite open clusters is either 0 or 1 for θ = 0 or θ > 0, respectively.
Stochastic routing algorithms Traditional routing algorithms, such as those used on the Internet, are mostly deterministic. Tailored to be efficient, they are guessable, which is not a good property for our purpose. By contrast, stochastic routing algorithms seem to be better. The basic idea is sending randomly a packet to one of possible routes, not necessarily the "best" one. When the message holder forwards a packet, the choice of next-hop is random, following a nexthop probability distribution. The main challenge is how to determine the best next-hop probabilities that optimize a given specific goal. Previous works on stochastic routing [16] [17] [18] focus on performance metrics (latency, throughput, acceptance rate, etc.) which are not of major importance to QKD networks whose priority is security. Besides, the 4-connected grid topology also makes previous optimizations on stochastic routing useless. We need to build our own stochastic routing algorithms. 
Given a non-negative small value ∆, we must find out the critical p c such that
Here, we propose a heuristic method and use simulations to validate our method.
It is well known that the critical probability for the 2-dimensional lattice percolation is about 0.6. From this value to 1, the percolation probability θ is greater than zero, non-decreasingly and continuously tends to 1. Let ξ be the probability that a given vertex is encircled by unsafe vertices, we have θ = 1 − ξ. From Approximation 1 we can derive the condition on ξ w.r.t a given ∆ as follows:
Our task now turns into studying ξ in the region close to 0. The trivial case where the given vertex is encircled by its four unsafe neighbors gives the lower bound of ξ, or:
If we set p s = 0.8 then from (2) we have ξ > 1.6 × 10 −3 . It is small enough to temporarily set p c = 0.8 in order to incrementally study ξ in its low-value region.
We first study ξ in the one-dimensional case. To distinguish ξ in the onedimensional and two-dimensional cases we denote by ξ (1) and ξ (2) , respectively. We measure ξ
(1) for a given radius r (see Fig. 3 .A). 
We now extend to ξ (2) from ξ (1) . Assume that we are focusing on the vertex O in the two-dimensional lattice. Let R(r) be the set of vertices of distance r from O. We study unsafe circuits inside R(r). Denote by (see Fig. 3 .C and Fig.  3.B 
):
-G(r): the event that there are unsafe circuits that encircle the vertex O and do not exceed R(r). -G LR (r): the event that there are unsafe vertices at both the left and the right of the vertex O. These unsafe vertices are inside the radius r from O.
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-G U D(r) : the event that are unsafe vertices both above and below the vertex O. These unsafe vertices are inside the radius r from O.
By applying (3) to (4), we have:
Based on G(r) we define the event G(r 1 , r 2 ) is an event that there is no unsafe circuit inside the inferior R(r 1 ) but there is an unsafe circuit inside the exterior R(r 2 ). Let ξ(r 1 , r 2 ) be the probability that the event G(r 1 , r 2 ) appears. We have: ξ(r 2 ) = ξ(r 1 , r 2 ) + ξ(r 1 )
Let r 2 tend to infinity and set r 1 = r, we have:
The upper bound of ξ is estimated by applying (5) to (6):
If a circuit belongs to the set G(r, ∞) then its length must be equal or greater than 2r. As such, the minimum degree of p e in the function ξ(r, ∞) is 2r or ξ(r, ∞) = O p 2r e = O (1 − p s ) 2r . We consider the ratio between ξ and (1 − p s ) 2r . From (2), The radius r
The function . We realize that in order to get a great ratio about 10 8 , we can choose r = 8 for p s ∈ [0.8 : 0.9] and r = 6 for p s ∈ [0.9 : 1]. With these choices of r, we can ignore ξ(r, ∞) in the formula of the upper bound of ξ. We derive from (7) to the following approximation:
Simulations We first determined the possible size of the world-wide quantum network according to our proposed model. The Earth's surface is 510,065,600 square kilometers. The optimal length of QKD links so far is believed to be approximately 40 km long [11] . Thus, the network size is approximatively of 600 × 600. Simulation was done in the 2-dimensional grid lattice 600 × 600. For each experiment, we randomly generated an untrusted network w.r.t a given p s . Then, we used the spreading algorithm to find the greatest connected safe cluster. We calculate the probability ξ si that a safe vertex does not belong to the greatest safe cluster as follows:
The number of nodes belonging to the greatest safe cluster. The number of all the safe nodes.
We executed 10 4 experiments for each p s . Table 4 shows theoretic values and simulation results. We realize that as p s increases the mean of ξ si gets closer to its lower bound, and both tends to 0. For p s ∈ [0.8 : 0.9], the upper bound of ξ is important in comparison with p e = 1 − p s . This implies that the probability that the final key is eavesdropped in its transmission is greater than that of the final key being eavesdropped at the transmitter. This is out of our interest. By contrast, for p s ∈ [0.93 : 1] the upper probability of ξ is approximate or less than the probability of this vertex itself being unsafe. This seems more interesting. 5 Applying stochastic routing algorithms
Some proposed routing algorithms
An adaptive drunkard's routing algorithm (ADRA) In the classic drunkard's walk problem, the next-hop probability distribution is unbiased. We propose an adaptive drunkard's routing algorithm, named ADRA, that is biased. The idea is to give a bigger chance for the vertex that is closer to the destination vertex. Assume that the vertex v A wants to send a message to the vertex v B . The vertex v A computes next-hop probabilities for its neighbors. This computation is based on the coordinate correlations between neighbors and v B . The higher probability is given to the vertex that is closer to v B . Then the vertex v A randomly chooses one of its neighbors to forward the message, but according to the probability distribution that has been computed. Anyone that subsequently receives the message would do the same thing and the chain of communication would continue to reach to v B .
A constant-length stochastic routing algorithm (l-SRA) The length of a path is the number of the vertices belonging to the path. A vertex may be counted as many times as the path runs through this vertex. The distance between two vertices is the length of the shortest path between these vertices. Our constant-length stochastic routing algorithm, called l-SRA(l) or l-SRA for short, is a stochastic routing algorithm that takes a value l as input and tries to transmit a message by a random path of length l.
Assume that there are some different paths π 1 , . . . , π m that hold l (π1) = . . . = l (πm) = l. Note that in the 4-connected grid lattice, it must l = d + 2 × k, k ≥ 0. When sending a message l-SRA will choose randomly a path π i among π 1 , . . . , π m according to a probability distribution that holds two following conditions:
Theorem 1. The probability that l-SRA(l) chooses successfully a safe path to send one message depends only on the safe probability p and the length l, not on the distance d between Alice and Bob:
A parameterized-length stochastic routing algorithm (k-SRA) This algorithm takes an input parameter k > 1, and tries to transmit the message by a path of length l ≤ k × d. We call this algorithm k-SRA(k) or k-SRA for short. It is built based on l-SRA. The idea is as follows. When k-SRA(k) receives the input k > 1, it considers the paths of length l ≤ k × d. Note that the difference between the length and the distance cannot be an odd number. Therefore, the possible lengths are
). When sending a message k-SRA(k) chooses randomly for l a value among d, (d+2), . . . , (d+2×
) according to the uniform distribution, i.e:
Once l was chosen, k-SRA uses l-SRA to send the message. This implies that the message will take a random path that has the length l.
Theorem 2. The probability that k-SRA(k) chooses successfully a safe path to send one message depends on the safe probability p, the input parameter k, and also the distance d between Alice and Bob:
Our proposed routing algorithms in some attack strategies
We consider two attack strategies of Eve:
1. Dynamic attack: To catch a set of N messages Eve frequently re-chooses nodes being attacked. 2. Static attack: Eve keeps her choice of the nodes being attacked until all N messages have been sent.
Because the algorithm ADRA is based on random walk, it does not give rigorous mathematical results. Its performance is estimated by experimental statistics. The algorithm l-SRA is not a real routing solution. This algorithm only executes one sub-task of the algorithm k-SRA. The algorithm k-SRA presents some rigorous bounds. Theorem 3. If Eve executes a dynamic attack, then the probability that there is at least one safe path in N routings of k-SRA(k) depends on N , the safe probability p, the input parameter k, and the distance d between Alice and Bob:
We have a lemma derived directly from the theorem 3. Lemma 1. If Eve executes a dynamic attack, given and k-SRA(k), then we have the threshold N 0 responding to the second question stated in Section 2:
Where λ is evaluated in (9) . Theorem 4. If Eve executes a static attack, then the upper bound of the probability that there is at least one safe path in N routings of k-SRA(k) depends on N , the safe probability p, the input parameter k, and the distance d between Alice and Bob:
Where λ is evaluated in (9) . The equality is possible when N ≤ 4.
We have a lemma derived directly from the theorem 4.
Lemma 2. If Eve executes a static attack, given and k-SRA(k), we have the threshold N 0 responding to the second question stated in Section 2:
Where λ is evaluated in (9) . The equality is possible when N 0 ≤ 4.
Simulations
ADRA's simulations The next-hop probabilities computation can vary to result in many ADRA's variants. Here we reused the next-hop probabilities computation presented in [19] . Then, we ran simulations in the lattice 600 × 600, in varying the safety probability p s ∈ [0.93 : 1] and the distance d AB between Alice and Bob [19, 20] . For each p s , we generated a network with randomly spread eave-droppers. For each distance d AB , we generated 400 (Alice, Bob) pairs. For each such pair, we ran 400 experiments. In each one we generated stochastic routes from Alice to Bob until we find a safe one (i.e., a route with no Eve). For each 400 experiments we gathered the largest number of messages that were needed. To avoid sending an infinite number of messages, we set the maximum effort to 10 4 messages. Table 5 .3 presents simulation results. This suggests that there exists a threshold of the number of sending messages above which we can be almost certain that there exists at least one safe message. Table 2 . Worst cases's experiment results. Symbol × stands for more than 10,000.
k-SRA's simulations Simulations were implemented in the lattice 600 × 600. We ran 10 4 experiments. The table 5.3 shows the lower bounds, the simulation values, and the upper bounds for the case of k = 2 and d = 10 with p s = 0, 93; 0.95; 0.97; 0.99. Note that the lower bound holds if N messages have taken the only possible path. The convergence of the experimental results to their upper bound is significant. We realize that the secrecy probability of the final key is a non-decreasing function. As the number of sent messages increases, this probability converges to its upper bound. Moreover, both tend to 1 as N → ∞.
Conclusions
We investigated constraints of quantum networks, in particularly, the ineluctable probability that some nodes are compromised. Given the distance between source and destination, we proposed routing algorithms and estimated the number of pieces that the message must be divided into with respect to the distance and the compromising probability distribution imposed over nodes. The principle result of our work is that it opens another door allowing to investigate QKD networks using percolation theory and stochastic routing.
A lot of work remains to be done in the future. For example, we need to take into account key authentication to complete our key exchange scheme. The eavesdropping distribution was uniform in this paper. More complex probability distributions seem more interesting. Studying other topologies will be of significance, grids are only the first step. We also aim at finding rigorous and tight formulas. Besides, we must improve our stochastic routing proposals, e.g. hiding routing information as onion routing. We attach importance to throughput and computational overhead in practice. We plan to carry out a cost estimation with respect to today's QKD technology. ps = 0.93 
Appendix
Proof of theorem 1
Pr k-SRA(k) takes l × Pr l-SRA(l) takes a safe path Pr(π i is failed) (12) Where the equality holds i.i.f π 1 , . . . , π N are independent. We first prove with N = 2. Assume that π 1 , π 2 have the length l 1 , l 2 respectively, and have l common nodes (0 ≤ l ≤ min(l 1 , l 2 )). We have:
Inequality (12) was proven with N = 2. We iterate this to obtain (12) for ∀N . Note that the equality holds iff π 1 . . . π N are separated. In the square 4-connected lattice there are maximum 4 separated paths between Alice and Bob. Thus, if N > 4, the equality for (12) cannot appear. By applying (12) to (11) 
